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_________________ 
DEBATE 
_________________ 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE STATUTORY DAMAGE 
AWARDS IN COPYRIGHT CASES 
In successive months during the summer of 2009, the music labels 
won two monstrous jury verdicts for willful copyright infringement 
against two peer-to-peer file sharers.  In June, a Minneapolis jury 
found single mother Jammie Thomas-Rasset liable for $1.92 million 
for downloading and sharing twenty-four songs on KaZaA’s file-
sharing network.  One month later, a Boston jury ordered college stu-
dent Joel Tenenbaum to pay $675,000 for downloading and sharing 
thirty songs in the same manner.  Neither jury made a finding about 
the damage caused to the music labels by the defendants’ activities.  
Rather, both awards were based on the Copyright Act’s range of statu-
tory damages of $750 to $150,000 per work—available to those who 
register their works prior to infringement. 
In this debate, Professor Pamela Samuelson and Ben Sheffner dis-
cuss whether such “whopping” statutory damage awards are constitu-
tional.  Samuelson argues that while not all statutory damage awards—
or even all those extracted from peer-to-peer file sharers—are uncons-
titutional, it is “difficult to square [the verdicts from this summer] 
with Congressional intent or with the Supreme Court’s due process 
jurisprudence.”  Relying on the “guideposts” established by the Court 
in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore to judge punitive damage awards, 
Samuelson lays out the case for reducing the “grossly excessive” jury 
verdicts.  In response, Sheffner argues that the guideposts set out in 
Gore have no application to statutory damages because the Court in 
Gore was primarily concerned with “fair notice” to defendants.  And 
although the range of statutory damages is broad, notice is not a valid 
concern where that range is “set forth in black and white” in the Cop-
yright Act.  Thus, while reasonable people may disagree on the proper 
damages for defendants like Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum, those 
concerns are “essentially legislative” not constitutional. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
The Unconstitutional Excessiveness of Some Statutory Damage Awards  
in Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Copyright Cases 
Pamela Samuelson† 
A substantial number of persons in the United States have been 
sued for copyright infringement for engaging in peer-to-peer file shar-
ing of copyrighted sound recordings and motion pictures.  See Jeff 
Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/ 
05music.html (estimating that about 30,000 people had been sued).  
The overwhelming majority of these lawsuits have been settled by the 
file sharer’s agreement to pay some compensation to the plaintiffs, 
generally between $2000 and $5000.  J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Ex-
cessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing:  The Troubling Ef-
fects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528 n.19 (2004).  At least ten defendants in re-
ported peer-to-peer cases involving sound recordings have either al-
lowed default judgments to be entered against them or have lost on 
summary judgment motions.  See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Tait, 
No. 07-134-J16-HTS, 2008 WL 2415036 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2008); 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. 06-00120-BR, 2007 WL 1853956 
(E.D. N.C. June 26, 2007).  In each case, courts have awarded $750 
per infringed song, the statutory damages minimum for non-innocent 
infringements.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).  The number of in-
fringed songs ranged between seven and eleven, producing total statu-
tory damage awards against these ten file sharers between $5250 and 
$8250.  Two other file-sharing defendants went to trial, were found li-
able for infringement, and were also ordered to pay $750 per in-
fringed song, for total awards in one case of $22,500, BMG Music v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005), and $40,500 in the other, Atl. 
Recording Co. v. Howell, No. 06-02076-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4080008, at 
*3 (D. Ariz. Aug 29, 2008).  These twelve awards are obviously higher 
than the typical settlement amounts, and likely made a substantial dif-
ference to the defendants’ pocketbooks, probably enough to deter 
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them from further infringements as well as to compensate the record-
ing companies for the infringement and other costs. 
Despite the high multiple of $750 per infringed song in these 
twelve cases as compared with the actual damages incurred from in-
fringement, these awards are consistent with Congressional intent, see 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 2-3 (1999) (citing concern about internet 
user “piracy”), as well as with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
due process limitations on grossly excessive money damage awards.  In 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Supreme 
Court set forth guidelines for determining whether money damage 
awards were so grossly excessive as to run afoul of the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution.  Reprehensibility of the defendant’s con-
duct is, the Court said, “[p]erhaps the most important indicium” for 
determining whether a punitive monetary award is excessive.  Id. at 
575.  Although the relevant ratio for judging excessiveness is generally 
ten to one between the award claimed to be excessive and actual dam-
ages, the Court also recognized that higher ratios might be appropri-
ate when the actual damages were small and the reprehensibility 
greater.  Id. at 580-82. 
In subsequent cases, the Court has made clear that very high mul-
tiples over actual damages (e.g., more than 100:1) cannot be justified 
merely because the jury believed that a particular defendant might 
have engaged in wrongful conduct as to others.  See, e.g., Phillip Morris 
USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007) (striking down a jury 
award because the jury had been instructed that it could punish the 
defendant for harm that it had done to others besides the plaintiff); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427-29 (2003) 
(striking down a $145 million award because it was excessive in rela-
tion to actual damages and was aimed at punishing the defendant for 
unsavory acts not related to the acts that gave rise to the Campbells’ 
lawsuit).  The Court’s reluctance to affirm awards of very high mul-
tiples over actual damages arises from concerns that high-ratio jury 
awards may be based on speculation or unwarranted assumptions.  In 
addition, very high multiples pose risks of arbitrary and capricious 
awards and double recovery since other similarly injured persons 
could bring suit on the same or similar grounds.  Finally, very high-
ratio awards are quasi-criminal in nature, yet lack the due process sa-
feguards that would attend criminal actions.  See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 
586-97 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
In the twelve peer-to-peer file-sharing cases mentioned above, the 
ratio of actual damages to award is very high, but the Court has rec-
ognized that higher ratios may be permissible where, as here, actual 
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damages are small.  Judges who have awarded statutory damages in these 
twelve cases seem to regard file sharing as reprehensible, but not so re-
prehensible as to justify an award of more than the statutory minimum. 
The jury awards against file-sharers Jammie Thomas-Rasset and 
Joel Tenenbaum are, by contrast, difficult to square either with Con-
gressional intent or with the Supreme Court’s due process jurispru-
dence.  Their file-sharing activities were no more heinous than the 
file-sharing activities of the twelve plaintiffs against whom the mini-
mum statutory damages were awarded.  Yet Thomas-Rasset was pu-
nished (there is no other word for it) at a first trial with a jury award 
of $9250 per infringed song, and then upon retrial with an award (for 
the very same conduct) of $80,000 per infringed song.  The statutory 
damage award against Tenenbaum was $22,500 per infringed song.  
The jury awards in these two cases were arbitrary and capricious, fu-
eled by speculation, and lacking in sound justification.  Both awards 
were grossly excessive, but especially egregious was the $1.92 million 
award against Thomas. 
Thomas-Rasset is not the sort of infringer against whom Congress 
intended awards of enhanced statutory damages (now up to $150,000 
per infringed work, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006)).  The conduct at 
issue in RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), by 
contrast, exemplifies the kind of egregious infringement for which 
enhanced damages should be available.  See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 144-
45 (1975) (stating that enhanced damages should be available in “ex-
ceptional cases”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1975) (same).  Peri 
ran a counterfeit sound recording business for years.  He made sub-
stantial profits from infringement, although he kept such dreadful 
records that the extent of his profits was difficult to determine.  Out of 
the nearly two million recordings Peri had made and sold, nearly ni-
nety percent were copyright infringements.  Peri was charged with in-
fringing twenty-seven of RSO’s copyrighted works, and the award 
against him was $1.45 million. 
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum are far from innocent or inadver-
tent infringers, but their copyright sins are far less reprehensible than 
Peri’s.  They were merely young and foolish, not commercial counter-
feiters; they merely enjoyed the songs they downloaded and shared, 
not sold them to others for profit.  Yet, the awards against these two 
file sharers involve significantly higher ratios of actual harm to the sta-
tutory damage award than in Peri. 
The only plausible explanation for the outlandishly large jury 
awards against Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum was the jury’s desire to 
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punish them for the sins of all file sharers at the direct or indirect urg-
ing of the recording industry plaintiffs.  See Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:  A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript pt. I-
B), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375604 (explaining that 
courts and commentators are increasingly recognizing that statutory 
damage awards, especially at the high end of the range, are punitive in 
intent and punitive in effect).  Under the Supreme Court’s due 
process jurisprudence, juries seem to be punishing these individuals 
for the acts of millions of other file sharers who are “strangers to the 
litigation” on behalf of copyright owners who are also “strangers to the 
litigation” as to copyrighted works that are not before the court.  Wil-
liams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (“[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause 
forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant 
for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly 
represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, 
strangers to the litigation.”).  Because there are insufficient con-
straints on jury awards of statutory damages, courts should draw upon 
the Court’s due process jurisprudence by reducing grossly excessive 
statutory damage awards in peer-to-peer music file-sharing cases either 
to the $750 minimum, which seems to have become the norm in the 
reported cases, or to something much closer to the minimum.  See, 
e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) 
(directing de novo review of excessive jury awards). 
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REBUTTAL 
Constitutional Limits on Copyright Statutory Damages 
Ben Sheffner† 
Copyright used to be a relatively obscure subject, of interest main-
ly to authors, composers, artists, and the publishers, record compa-
nies, and movie studios who exploited their works.  The Internet, 
however, has brought once-obscure copyright issues into the homes of 
ordinary citizens, who now have the technical ability—though not the 
legal right—to copy and distribute music and movies to anyone else 
with a web connection, all without permission from or payment to the 
copyright owners.  This past summer witnessed perhaps a new height 
of public attention to copyright, as two among the thousands of indi-
viduals targeted by the major U.S. record labels for illegally download-
ing and “sharing” music over peer-to-peer networks went to trial.  In 
the first case, a jury in Minneapolis awarded the plaintiffs $80,000 per 
song, totaling a whopping $1.92 million, after finding that Jammie 
Thomas-Rasset had willfully infringed twenty-four works.  Barely a 
month later, a Boston jury ordered Joel Tenenbaum to pay $675,000, 
or $22,500 per song, for downloading and “sharing” thirty songs. 
There is no dispute that such awards were stunningly huge.  Even 
the victorious record labels agree.  “We were shocked,” said Sony Mu-
sic Entertainment Deputy General Counsel Wade Leak a few days af-
ter the Thomas-Rasset verdict.  “I suspected we were going to win, but I 
really thought they would come in with a lower number.”  Posting of 
Ben Sheffner to Copyrights & Campaigns, Sony BMG Attorney:  ‘We were 
shocked’ by Size of Verdict; Concedes $1.92 Million Award Could Be Reduced 
on Appeal, http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/06/ 
sony-bmg-attorney-we-were-shocked-by.html ( June 20, 2009) (quoting 
Press Release, Columbia Law School, Aggressive Pursuit of Illegal File-
Sharers Defended by Top Music-Industry Lawyer ( June 20, 2009)). 
Though I support the labels’ litigation campaign against individu-
al peer-to-peer infringers, I have serious reservations about the size of 
the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum awards.  At some gut level, they just 
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feel “too big.”  I also fear that the public relations hit the industry took 
from these verdicts may eventually lead to a loss of political support 
for copyright owners.  But we’re not here to debate whether the Tho-
mas-Rasset and Tenenbaum verdicts were “too big” for our taste, or 
whether they were helpful or hurtful to the music industry.  Rather, 
we were asked to debate whether such large awards of statutory dam-
ages violate the U.S. Constitution.  I believe the answer is no. 
First, a little history is in order.  Statutory damages have been part 
of the U.S. copyright landscape since the first days of the Republic.  
Actually, before then:  the issue was discussed in the Continental Con-
gress in 1783.  See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 
340, 350 (1998).  And, in language that mirrored Britain’s 1710 Sta-
tute of Anne, the First Congress included in the Copyright Act of 1790 
a statutory damages provision making an infringer liable for “the sum 
of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in his or their pos-
session.”  Act of May 31, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 125.  Congress has pe-
riodically increased the amount of available statutory damages over 
the centuries; under the most recent iteration of the Copyright Act, 
the jury may award statutory damages “in a sum of not less than $750 
or more than $30,000 as the court considers just,” or up to $150,000 
per infringed work if they find the infringement to be “willful.”  17 
U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
There are two justifications for permitting copyright plaintiffs to 
pursue statutory, rather than actual, damages.  First, statutory damages 
“give the owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done him, 
in a case where the rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of 
damages or discovery of profits.”  F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary 
Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231 (1952) (citation omitted).  Second, statu-
tory damages may be imposed to punish the infringer, and thus deter 
him, and others, from further infringement.  See, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, 
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of punitive dam-
ages—to punish and prevent malicious conduct—is generally 
achieved under the Copyright Act through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c)(2), which allow increases to an award of statutory damages in 
cases of willful infringement.”); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television 
Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Because awards of statu-
tory damages serve both compensatory and punitive purposes, a plain-
tiff may recover statutory damages ‘whether or not there is adequate 
evidence of the actual damages suffered by plaintiff or of the profits 
reaped by defendant,’ in order ‘to sanction and vindicate the statutory 
policy of discouraging infringement.’” (citations omitted)). 
60 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 53 
PENNumbra 
Statutory damages, though their origins pre-date the Internet by 
centuries, are tailor-made for peer-to-peer cases like Thomas-Rasset’s 
and Tenenbaum’s.  Actual damages in such cases are difficult, per-
haps impossible, to calculate.  Though it is tempting to say that an in-
fringer who used KaZaA to obtain a song that costs ninety-nine cents 
on iTunes caused no more than ninety-nine cents in actual damages, 
such analysis would be flawed.  For such a calculation completely ig-
nores the distribution or “sharing” engaged in by peer-to-peer users.  
The songs Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum were found to have in-
fringed were located in the “shared” folder of their hard drives and 
were downloaded by untold numbers of other KaZaA users; indeed 
that is the very purpose of such networks.  Yet because of the way that 
KaZaA is configured and the lack of record-keeping by KaZaA itself, 
the plaintiffs were forced to admit that they are unable to determine 
how many others Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum “shared” their songs 
with.  The availability of statutory damages prevents infringers and 
their facilitators from profiting from such willful blindness, whose 
primary intent is to thwart copyright enforcement. 
Additionally, statutory damages are useful in deterring both the 
actual infringer and others from committing similar bad acts in the 
future.  Compensating copyright owners for their actual losses in the 
case at bar is insufficient; as then-District Judge Sonia Sotomayor once 
ruled, “statutory damages must be sufficient enough to deter future 
infringements and should not be calibrated to favor a defendant by 
merely awarding minimum estimated losses to a plaintiff.”  Top Rank, 
Inc. v. Allerton Lounge, Inc., No. 96-7864, 1998 WL 35152791, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1998).  As the Supreme Court itself has acknowl-
edged, peer-to-peer use involves “infringement on a gigantic scale,” 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 
(2005), and it is the public policy of the United States that it be 
curbed.  Imposing statutory damages on such infringers is an impor-
tant tool in combating it. 
Professor Samuelson argues that the Supreme Court’s cases im-
posing limits on punitive damages similarly limit the imposition of sta-
tutory damages.  Respectfully, I disagree.  In BMW of North America, Inc. 
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Court made clear that its underlying 
concern about punitive damages was that they failed to provide “fair 
notice not only of the conduct that will subject [a potential defen-
dant] to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State 
may impose.”  Id. at 574.  This concern is absent in the context of cop-
yright statutory damages.  While it is true that the statutory range of 
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$750 to $150,000 is broad, it is set forth in black and white at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504, and infringers have, at least, constructive notice of the penalties 
that may be imposed on them for their bad acts.  The due process 
concerns present in the case of unlimited punitive damages are simply 
not present here. 
Moreover, attempting to impose Gore’s rubric for analyzing puni-
tive damages awards on copyright statutory damages awards involves 
attempting to pound the proverbial square peg into a round hole.  
Gore set forth three “guideposts” for determining whether a punitive 
damages award is unconstitutionally excessive:  1) the “degree of re-
prehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct, id. at 575; 2) the ratio be-
tween the punitive and actual damages, id. at 580; and 3) “the civil or 
criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable miscon-
duct,” id. at 583.  But at least two of those don’t work in the context of 
statutory damages.  We can debate how “reprehensible” infringers like 
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum are; I agree that they aren’t the worst 
of the worst.  But saying, for example, they’re in the mid-range of re-
prehensibility doesn’t tell us much about where in the statutory range 
the award should fall; as we saw with Thomas-Rasset, even an award in the 
middle of the range can represent an enormous sum when multiplied by 
the number of infringed works (and keep in mind that the plaintiffs 
sued on only a tiny fraction of the 1702 songs she was caught “sharing”). 
Further, Gore guideposts two and three don’t work at all with cop-
yright statutory damages.  In many copyright cases (Thomas-Rasset and 
Tenenbaum included), it is impossible to compare actual to statutory 
damages because, as noted above, it is difficult or impossible to meas-
ure actual damages.  Indeed, statutory damages exist in part to relieve 
copyright owners of the burden of proving up actual damages where, 
as a practical matter, they cannot.  See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contempo-
rary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231 (1952).  And it makes no sense to 
speak of comparing the actual damages with “the civil or criminal pe-
nalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct,” Gore, 517 
U.S. at 583; statutory damages are the “civil . . . penalties” that Con-
gress has chosen to impose on copyright infringers.  If we’re going to 
debate the constitutionality of statutory damages, we’re going to have 
to do so under the much more deferential standard set forth in St. 
Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 
(1919)—under which, as far as I am aware, no award has ever been in-
validated. 
Reasonable people can disagree over the proper amount of statu-
tory damages for individual non-profit infringers like Thomas-Rasset 
and Tenenbaum.  I, for one, would likely be willing to trade a signifi-
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cantly lower range of available damages for a cheap and streamlined 
process for adjudicating such cases.  See, e.g., Mark Lemley & R. An-
thony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (“Another way to reduce the 
cost of enforcement is to create some sort of quick, cheap dispute res-
olution system that enables copyright owners to get some limited re-
lief against abusers of peer-to-peer systems . . . .”).  But these are essen-
tially legislative choices.  Those who are outraged by the recent high, 
and high-profile, statutory damages awards in copyright cases should 
take their case to Congress, and argue for a change in the statute.  I 
suspect that they are instead focusing on untested constitutional ar-
guments because they realize that, unlike many in academia and the 
copyleft or “free culture” movement, members of Congress view In-
ternet piracy as a serious problem, deserving of serious punishment.  I 
doubt that the Supreme Court will interfere with Congress’s judgment 
on this subject.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in a different context, 
“[T]his Court has been . . . deferential to the judgment of Congress in 
the realm of copyright.”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003).  I 
expect the Court to exhibit similar deference should the issue of the 
constitutionality of large copyright statutory damages awards ever 
reach its docket. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Adapting the Supreme Court's Guideposts on Punitive Awards  
to Copyright Statutory Damages 
Pamela Samuelson 
I agree with Ben Sheffner that the jury awards of statutory damag-
es against Jammie Thomas-Rasset and Joel Tenenbaum in peer-to-peer 
file-sharing copyright cases were “stunningly huge.”  He and I also 
agree that statutory damage awards for willful copyright infringement 
are often punitive in nature.  We may even agree that the Thomas-
Rasset and Tenenbaum awards are so stunningly high as to be punitive.  
These points of agreement are important keystones in my argument 
that the $1.92 million award in the Thomas-Rasset case and the 
$675,000 award in the Tenenbaum case were grossly excessive and 
should be reduced in keeping with the Supreme Court’s modern due 
process jurisprudence. 
Where Sheffner and I mainly differ is in our interpretations of his-
tory and our perspectives on the second and third “guideposts” for 
judging when punitive awards are constitutionally suspect under that 
jurisprudence. 
Sheffner’s assertion that “[s]tatutory damages have been part of 
the U.S. copyright landscape since the first days of the Republic” con-
veys the impression that statutory damages are such a tried and true 
part of U.S. history that they cannot possibly be unconstitutional.  
However, the fifty-cent-per-sheet penalty awardable under the Copy-
right Act of 1790 is importantly different from the statutory damage 
regime under the Copyright Act of 1976.  Apples and oranges may 
both be fruits, but we all know that apples and oranges are very dis-
tinct varieties of fruit.  The 1790 per-sheet penalty is likewise funda-
mentally distinct from the statutory damage regime in the 1976 Act. 
For one thing, the 1790 provision was explicitly designated as 
“punish[ment].”  Act of May 31, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 125.  Half of 
each award was statutorily required to go to the U.S. treasury.  Id.  The 
penalty was fixed in amount, had no relationship to the actual damage 
that the copyright owner suffered, and was not justified on the ground 
that it was sometimes difficult to prove actual damages.  Because of 
the penal, quasi-criminal nature of this remedy, courts tended to con-
strue it very narrowly.  In Rogers v. Jewett, 20 F. Cas. 1114, 1115 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1858), for instance, the court denied a copyright owner’s re-
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quest for a per-sheet penalty award because the “highly penal” nature 
of this award meant that it should be strictly construed, and the de-
fendant had copied only part of the plaintiff’s book, not the whole 
thing.  Per-sheet penalties were, moreover, only available for infring-
ing sheets actually in the possession of the defendant.  See, e.g., Backus 
v. Gould, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 798 (1849) (reversing a jury verdict for 
$2,069.75 because this award had been based on the number of in-
fringing sheets that the defendant had printed when the statute called 
for the penalty to be available only for the infringing sheets in the de-
fendant’s possession).  Per-sheet penalty awards were, in fact, relatively 
uncommon in the nineteenth century.  Most copyright owners chal-
lenged infringement in equity because they wanted injunctive relief 
and an accounting of the defendant’s profits that only equity courts 
could provide; equity could not award penalties. 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1909 is replete with 
expressions of dissatisfaction with the per-sheet penalty as a signal 
failure of the nineteenth century copyright regime.  See, e.g., Proceed-
ings of the Second Session of the Conference on Copyright (Nov. 1-4, 
1905) (complaining about inadequacies of the per-sheet penalty), in 2 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 1, 243 (E. Fulton 
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).  To address the need for penal 
remedies, Congress created a new and separate criminal provision for 
willful infringements for profit.  The new civil statutory damage re-
gime was created as an alternative to recovery of actual damages to the 
plaintiff and defendant’s profits.  The primary purpose of this alterna-
tive award was to provide some compensation to copyright owners 
when damages and profits were difficult to prove.  The provision ex-
plicitly stated that statutory damages “shall not be regarded as a penalty.”  
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081. 
In keeping with this non-penal purpose, courts generally con-
strued the 1909 Act’s statutory damage provision with some circums-
pection.  Some courts, for instance, refused to order defendants to 
pay statutory damages when actual damages or profits could be prov-
en.  See, e.g., Zeigelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).  
Some judges also reduced statutory damage awards when actual dam-
ages or profits were substantially smaller.  See, e.g., Turner & Dahnken v. 
Crowley, 252 F. 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1918) (reducing a $7000 statutory 
damage award to $560, the estimated profit the defendant had made 
from infringement). 
The 1976 Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress wanted to 
create a more nuanced statutory damage regime than the 1909 Act 
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provided.  For the exceptional cases of innocent infringement, it es-
tablished a lower minimum award.  For ordinary infringement cases, 
Congress created a wider range within which statutory awards could 
be made, but sought to cabin the risk for excessive awards by shifting 
to a “per infringed work” standard.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).  
Congress expected courts to consider actual damages and profits in 
the process of assessing statutory damages. 
The main novelties of the 1976 Act’s statutory damage regime 
were twofold.  The first was its introduction of a wholly new enhanced 
statutory damage award level for willful infringements, which Con-
gress expected to be used in exceptional cases (e.g., against profes-
sional counterfeiters).  The second was its limitation on the availability 
of statutory damages to copyright owners who promptly registered 
copyrights within three months of the work’s publication.  Penal func-
tions of copyright law were mainly to be fulfilled through the criminal 
infringement provisions, as in the 1909 Act. 
A closer look at the 1790 and 1976 Acts and the history that un-
dergirds them thus reveals insufficient continuity in statutory damages 
as a remedy in U.S. copyright law to insulate particular awards under 
the 1976 Act regime from constitutional challenge. 
Tara Wheatland and I argue in our recent article on statutory 
damages that courts have failed to recognize and abide by the tri-
partite structure that Congress intended to be used for awarding statu-
tory damages in copyright cases.  See Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:  A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375604.  Part III of Statutory Damages de-
monstrates that a set of principles can be derived from the statutory 
damage case law that would comport with Congressional intent as well 
as due process jurisprudence.  If courts followed these principles, 
grossly excessive and obviously punitive awards, such as those in the 
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases, would not happen, and it would 
not be necessary to invoke the Supreme Court’s due process jurispru-
dence to ensure that such awards were constitutionally sound.  How-
ever, because courts have yet to self-consciously develop a principled 
jurisprudence of statutory damage awards, we join the voices of several 
other commentators, including treatise author William Patry, and sev-
eral courts that have opined that the Supreme Court’s due process ju-
risprudence requires that grossly excessive statutory damage awards in 
copyright cases be reduced.  See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 22:181 (2009) (arguing that the award in UMG Record-
ings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. was “hardly necessary as a deterrent for a de-
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fendant who had not made a penny in profits off its use, and where 
plaintiff had conceded that it could not prove any actual damages” 
and inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence 
on punitive awards).  See also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra (manu-
script at 26 n.163) (citing cases and commentary opining that due 
process limits copyright statutory damage awards). 
The concern of the first “guidepost” set forth in BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), for judging whether punitive 
damage awards are so grossly excessive as to violate due process is the 
relative reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.  Higher punitive 
awards are obviously appropriate for highly reprehensible conduct.  This 
guidepost is adaptable to copyright cases, as Sheffner seems to agree. 
Sheffner contests the applicability of the second guidepost—
which focuses on the ratio between the actual damage suffered and 
the amount actually awarded—because statutory damages are de-
signed for situations where actual damages are difficult to prove.  He 
may be right that this includes peer-to-peer file sharing.  Yet, consider 
this:  If the record labels had not promptly registered the copyrights 
in their sound recordings, the jury would have been required to esti-
mate actual damages from Thomas’s downloading of those twenty-
four songs.  That award would almost certainly have been a lot closer 
to $750 per song than to the $80,000 per song actually awarded, and 
probably less than the statutory damage minimum.  I agree with 
Sheffner that Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum may have contributed 
to additional damage (although not necessarily to the plaintiffs in 
these cases) by making other songs available to peer-to-peer file share-
rs, and this can be considered when setting statutory damages.  But 
making copies of protected works available to others is not copyright 
infringement in the United States (because it is not a distribution of a 
copy), and only speculation, not evidence, exists that Thomas-Rasset 
or Tenenbaum actually facilitated other infringements. 
A more general point, though, is that the 1976 Act legislative his-
tory contemplates that courts would consider actual damages (or an 
approximation of them) in setting statutory damages.  Cf. H.R. REP. 
No. 94-1476, at 161 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff in an infringement suit is 
not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits and may choose to 
rely on the provision for minimum statutory damages.” (emphasis add-
ed)).  And courts routinely mention actual damages suffered by plain-
tiffs or the defendant’s profits attributable to infringement in setting 
statutory damages.  See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 
996 F.2d 1366, 1380-82 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming a $120,000 statutory 
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damage award where plaintiff alleged $125,000 in actual damages); see 
also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 293, 
303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“New Line’s statutory damages should be com-
mensurate with the actual damages incurred . . . .”).  Because of this, 
the second Gore guidepost is applicable in the copyright context. 
The third Gore guidepost focuses on other civil awards that might 
be rendered as to the conduct at issue.  Sheffner is right that the 
Court in Gore mentions notice as one factor to be considered; it re-
garded BMW as having insufficient notice that an Alabama court 
might award two or four million dollars in punitive damages for hav-
ing made a few minor repairs to new cars which were not revealed to 
BMW customers.  State Farm and other post-Gore cases, however, hardly 
mention notice.  Constructive notice that a certain penalty may be 
awarded is, moreover, insufficient to shield awards from due process 
review.  See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) 
(finding a due process violation in the application of a forfeiture pro-
vision); Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 403-
09 (5th Cir. 2000) (reducing punitive damage award under equal em-
ployment laws even though it was below the statutory maximum).  Fi-
nally, it is far from clear that the St. Louis Railway case on which Sheff-
ner relies is still good law under modern due process jurisprudence. 
We agree with Blaine Evanson that the main focus in the analysis 
of the third guidepost should be on how carefully the legislature cali-
brated the statutory damage provisions to achieve just results.  Blaine 
Evanson, Due Process in Statutory Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 601, 
628-37 (2005).  Wheatland and I have concluded that Congress has 
not carefully tailored the copyright statutory damage provision 
enough to avert arbitrary, capricious, and grossly excessive awards, as 
in the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases. 
In view of the $750 per-song minimum awards in a dozen other 
peer-to-peer file-sharing-of-music cases, the awards in the Thomas-
Rasset and Tenenbaum cases should be reduced.  In keeping with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 
1057 (2007), these young and foolish defendants should not be exces-
sively punished for the sins of other file-sharers as to music whose 
copyright owners are strangers to the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum lit-
igations.  Oddly enough, these defendants would almost have been 
better off if they had been charged with criminal copyright infringe-
ment, for the proof standard for willful infringement would have been 
higher and the maximum fine that could be levied was $250,000, see 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 3571(b)(3) (2006), one-eighth of the civil award 
levied against Thomas-Rasset and one-third that against Tenenbaum. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Historical Claims About Statutory Damages and  
the Inapplicability of BMW v. Gore 
Ben Sheffner 
Professor Samuelson writes that comparing ancient statutory 
damages awards to those of the present day is comparing apples and 
oranges.  I will happily concede that the world in which copyright 
owners operated in 1790 is vastly different than the one in which they 
find themselves today.  But my overall point stands:  Statutory damag-
es, which need not correlate closely with actual damages, have long 
been an important feature of U.S. copyright law.  They compensate 
the plaintiff for its loss (which may be difficult or impossible to calcu-
late) and punish the infringer, thus sending a deterrent message both 
to the defendant and to other potential infringers.  Statutory damag-
es’ lengthy history does not, by itself, insulate the concept from consti-
tutional challenge, but it puts the issue in context and demonstrates 
that awards that lack a close connection to actual damages are no no-
velty.  Professor Samuelson also uses history where she believes it 
serves her argument.  Her Closing Statement relies on what has be-
come a central trope of copyright critics:  Once upon a time, copy-
right law was properly balanced between private interests and the pub-
lic good, but sometime, in the not-too-distant past, things went awry.  
Heavily influenced by rapacious lobbyists for Big Content, a compliant 
Congress increased the scope and term of copyright and increased the 
penalties beyond all reason.  But cf. Justin Hughes, Copyright and In-
complete Historiographies:  Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 998-1046 (2006) (discussing, and discrediting, 
claims by copyright reformers that the terms “piracy” and “intellectual 
property” are recent in origin).   
At least in the case of statutory damages, I was surprised to learn 
recently that the modern-day limits are in certain cases significantly 
lower than those under the 1909 Act.  In a criticism of an early draft of 
Professor Samuelson’s recent article on statutory damages, Thomas 
Sydnor, of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, ran the numbers, ad-
justed for inflation, and came up with this rather striking table: 
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Table 1:  Statutory Damages Ranges (1909 vs. 2008) 
 
Year 
Innocent-
infringer  
minimum 
Non-innocent 
minimum
Non-innocent 
maximum
Willful-
infringer  
maximum 
1909 $5814 $5814 $116,279 $116,279 
2008 $200 $750 $30,000 $150,000 
 
Posting of Thomas Sydnor to PFF Blog, The ‘Lessigation’ of Copyright 
Scholarship:  A Review of Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:  A Remedy 
in Need of Reform (Part I), http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/07/ 
the_lessigation_of_copyright_scholarship_a_review.html (July 1, 2009, 
4:43 PM EST).  Most significantly, measured in 2008 dollars, the max-
imum statutory damages for “regular” (i.e., non-willful) infringement 
was almost four times greater in 1909 than in 2008:  $116,279 vs. 
$30,000 per work.  Similarly, each of the relevant limits has fallen 
from 1976 to 2008, when measured in constant dollars: 
 
Table 2:  Statutory Damages Ranges (1976 vs. 2008) 
 
Year 
Innocent-
infringer  
minimum 
Non-innocent 
minimum
Non-innocent 
maximum
Willful-
infringer  
maximum 
1976 $378 $946 $37,839 $189,124 
2008 $200 $750 $30,000 $150,000 
 
Id.  If one is to attack statutory damages, one cannot credibly do so by 
arguing that the maximum permissible awards have only recently in-
creased to unacceptable levels. 
Professor Samuelson points out that her article urging statutory 
damages reform includes a “set of principles [that] can be derived 
from the statutory damage case law that would comport with Congres-
sional intent as well as with due process jurisprudence.”  I gather that 
Professor Samuelson would have courts apply this set of principles and 
strike down or reduce statutory damages awards that fail to comport 
with them.  While some of the principles she suggests have merit as a 
 
 Values in rounded 2008 CPI-adjusted dollars 
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matter of policy, I find the prospect of using those principles as a basis 
for constitutional decisionmaking wrongheaded. 
First, to the extent one can accurately divine Congressional intent, 
it seems clear from the legislative history of the most recent amend-
ment to the statutory damages provisions of the Copyright Act that 
Congress had every intention of increasing awards against those who 
use the Internet to infringe.  See H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3 (1999) 
(“Many computer users are either ignorant that copyright laws apply 
to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught 
or prosecuted for their conduct.”); id. at 2 (stating that the increased 
statutory damages range is necessary to provide “more stringent deter-
rents to copyright infringement and stronger enforcement of the laws”). 
But more fundamentally, it seems strange to say that courts should 
divine Congressional intent, and then strike down as unconstitutional 
statutory damages awards that purportedly contravene such intent.  If 
Congress believes that the statutory damages range it has set has re-
sulted in excessive awards, then the solution is to amend the Copy-
right Act and to lower the range and save the Jammie Thomas-Rassets 
and Joel Tenenbaums of the world from financial ruin.  As far as I am 
aware, not a single member of Congress has proposed amending 17 
U.S.C. § 504 since last summer’s highly-publicized verdicts, which sug-
gests Congressional acquiescence in, if not embrace of, the juries’ 
handiwork. 
Professor Samuelson states that in creating a new, enhanced statu-
tory damages limit for “willful” infringers in the 1976 Act, Congress 
“expected” the heightened awards to be limited to “professional coun-
terfeiters.”  But even accepting that was indeed Congress’s expecta-
tion, the limitation to “professional counterfeiters” is simply not in the 
statute.  As William Patry explains in his treatise, 
Neither the Act nor the legislative history attempts to define “willful-
ness.”  The courts have developed two basic approaches:  (1) actual 
knowledge of the actual consequences of one’s conduct, or (2) actual or 
constructive knowledge of such consequences, which may include reck-
less disregard for the possibility that the conduct is infringing.  The 
Ninth Circuit takes the first, more restrictive, approach, limiting willful-
ness to actual knowledge, although not requiring a specific intent to in-
fringe.  The Second and Seventh Circuits permit actual or constructive 
knowledge.  Maliciousness is not required under either approach. 
6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:180 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted) (citing Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 
2001); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001)).  
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Moreover, even noncommercial infringers—those who do not seek 
monetary profit from their acts, but see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[R]epeated and exploita-
tive copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered 
for sale, may constitute a commercial use.”)—can cause enormous 
harm to copyright owners, sometimes even more than “professional 
counterfeiters.”  To illustrate, imagine two infringers on the Internet.  
One offers songs at fifty cents each, significantly undercutting iTunes’ 
standard price of ninety cents.  The other offers songs for free, thus 
reaping no revenue or profit at all.  But which one causes more harm 
to the copyright owner?  Likely, the latter.  Certainly it is appropriate 
for a harsh sanction to attach to both forms of infringement. 
Professor Samuelson’s counterfactual in which the plaintiffs in the 
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases were required to prove their actual 
damages is interesting, but I am not sure what it proves.  She submits 
that the amount “would almost certainly have been a lot closer to $750 
per song than to the $80,000 per song actually awarded, and probably 
less than the statutory damage minimum.”  I am not convinced.  The 
record labels conceded that it was “impossible” for them to measure 
the amount of actual damages, because KaZaA’s configuration pre-
vents third-party knowledge of transfers between peers.  The juries 
thus did not likely base their awards on an estimate of actual loss to 
the plaintiffs, but of some assessment of where on the $750 to 
$150,000 culpability scale the defendants fell. 
And I must take issue with Professor Samuelson’s blunt statement 
that “making copies of protected works available to others is not copy-
right infringement in the United States (because it is not a distribu-
tion of a copy), and only speculation, not evidence, exists that Thomas 
or Tenenbaum actually facilitated other infringements.”  Tenenbaum, 
for one, testified that he observed the “traffic tab” on KaZaA indicat-
ing that there were song files being downloaded from his computer by 
others.  The transfer of songs between users is, of course, the very 
purpose of the software; it would be rendered useless unless such 
transfers were taking place.  That Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum 
were distributing songs from their computers via KaZaA is a certainty, 
not “speculation.”  And as to the law, while it is true that some courts 
have held that “making available” does not constitute distribution un-
der the Copyright Act, numerous others have held that it does.  See, 
e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014 (“Napster users who upload file names to 
the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs’ distribution 
rights.”); Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 
199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that making a work available in a 
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public library infringes the distribution right); Atl. Recording Corp. v. 
Anderson, No. 06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 
2008) (finding that making files available “on KaZaA constituted a 
‘distribution’ for the purposes of . . . copyright infringement”); Mo-
town Record Co., LP v. DePietro, No. 04-2246, 2007 WL 576284, at *3 
n.38 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (same); Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. 
v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 638 (D. Md. 2006) (“Defendant oper-
ates . . . an online database of literary works, and by making availa-
ble . . . Plaintiff’s publications, he has infringed its right to distri-
bute.”); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. 
Tex. 2006) (“[T]he courts have recognized that making copyrighted 
works available to others may constitute infringement by distribu-
tion . . . .”); cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001) (hold-
ing electronic publishers liable for reproducing and distributing the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted works by placing works into an online database 
from which the works were “retrievable” by the public).  In sum, not-
withstanding Professor Samuelson’s arguments, I fail to see how the 
second Gore guidepost can be adapted to the cases we have been dis-
cussing, where there is truly no way to know the amount of actual 
damages against which the award of statutory damages can be measured. 
Lastly, Professor Samuelson’s attempt to minimize the notice con-
cerns underlying the Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurispru-
dence is undermined by the language of the cases themselves.  Start-
ing with Gore, the Court’s decisions in this area have emphasized that 
constitutional limits on punitive damages are required because other-
wise defendants would have no notice of the potential penalties they 
face.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2640 (2008) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Like the Court, I believe there is a need, 
grounded in the rule of law itself, to assure that punitive damages are 
awarded according to meaningful standards that will provide notice of 
how harshly certain acts will be punished . . . .”); Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) (“Unless a State insists upon 
proper standards that will cabin the jury’s discretionary authority, its 
punitive damages system may deprive a defendant of ‘fair notice . . . of 
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose . . . .’” (citing Gore, 
517 U.S. at 574); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 416-17 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 
532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001); Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (reasoning 
that defendants must be provided “fair notice not only of the conduct 
that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the pe-
nalty that a State may impose”); see also Verizon Cal. Inc. v. OnlineNIC, 
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Inc., No. 08-2832, 2009 WL 2706393, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) 
(“The third ‘guidepost’—the difference between the remedy at issue 
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases—
appears to rest almost entirely on the ‘fair notice’ aspect of the due 
process limitations on damages awards. . . . That limitation clearly has 
no application in the field of statutory damages awards, where the text 
of federal legislation explicitly discloses the range of penalties that 
may be awarded on a per-violation basis.”); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg 
Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004) (“The unregu-
lated and arbitrary use of judicial power that the Gore guideposts re-
medy is not implicated in Congress’ carefully crafted and reasonably 
constrained [copyright] statute.”).  Because Congress has defined the 
range, the Supreme Court’s concern about unbounded jury discretion 
is simply not present in the world of statutory damages. 
 
*      *      * 
 
In closing, I want to thank Professor Samuelson for the lively de-
bate, and PENNumbra for providing the platform.  And I want to em-
phasize that reasonable people can disagree over what the range of 
available statutory damages, and the award in a particular case, may 
be.  But those tasks are for Congress (and for a jury in an actual case), 
not for judges engaging in constitutional decisionmaking. 
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